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EDMUND F. WEHRLE 
"FORA 
HEALTHY 
AME RIC~' 
• • • 
Labor's Struggle for 
National Health Insurance 
1943--1949 
DURING THE 1940S ORGANIZED LABOR, searching for a way to provide its membership 
with basic health care, became the driving force 
in a decade long battle for national health in-
surance. Labor worked with the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government in an attempt to pass legis-
lation for a "Healthy America." The course of this 
campaign had a profound effect on the shape and sub-
stance of health care up to the present time. 
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Physician treating chil.d of a family covered l7y the Farm Secu- ~ 
rity Administration health plan, November 1939. In the fight ~ 
over a national health insurance bill both the Congress of In- :;: 
dustrial Organizations (CIO) and its opponent the American ~ 
a: 
Medical Association (AMA) used the image of the sick chil.d to ~ 
(]) 
sway public opinion. :::; 
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Arthur J Altmeyer, commissioner for Social Security, on his fi-
nal day at the job, April 10, 195 3. 
Labor did not always look to the government for so-
cial remedies. In the nineteenth century, health benefits 
most often took the form of mutual aid and insurance 
arrangements that union members paid for themselves. 
Unions had a well-learned suspicion of government in-
tervention in labor relations and relied on a tradition of 
voluntarism that focused on direct bargaining with em-
ployers for its gains. In negotiating contracts, however, 
labor organizations felt compelled to concentrate on 
wages, hours, and the very legitimacy of unions as bar-
gaining agents, rather than "fringe benefits" like health 
care. 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the labor 
movement worked with New Deal leaders in generating 
legislation beneficial to organized labor and began to 
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Senator James E. Murray (Democrat-Montana), September 
1957. 
abandon .traditional voluntarism to work with the grow-
ing federal government. World War II accelerated this 
process. When, in the 1940s, national health insurance 
captured congressional attention, organized labor was 
ready to participate. 
The movement for public health insurance coalesced 
around a group of professionals who worked for the new 
Social Security Board. Arthur Altmeyer, the commis-
sioner of social security, and Wilber Cohn, technical ad-
visor to the commissioner, had trained at the University 
of Wisconsin, home since about 1915 to the American 
Association for Labor Legislation which advocated state-
sponsored programs for health insurance. Isadore Falk, 
the director of research and statistics for the Social Se-
curity Board, held a Yale Ph.D. in public health and 
also had strong ties to the Wisconsin group. All had been 
influenced by the work of sociologist Michael Davis who 
in 1928 created the Committee on the Cost of Medical 
Care and became a leading voice in the drive for health 
legislation. The Social Security Board also had ties to 
organized labor with Marion Hedges, research director 
of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
on its staff. Several labor leaders served on its advisory 
board.1 
In 1938 Altmeyer, Cohn, and Falk helped arrange a 
National Health Conference attempting to pave the way 
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Senator RobertF. Wagner (Democrat-New York), n.d. 
for Senator Robert Wagner of New York to sponsor a 
national health insurance bill. Introduced in 1939, 
Wagner's bill (S 1620) proposed giving grants to states 
for the development of health insurance programs. Al-
though the plan had the support of key administration 
officials, President Franklin Roosevelt wavered and the 
bill failed. The opening round of a decade long fight 
had ended. 
Although the American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
and other labor organizations had representatives at the 
National Health Conference, they had not played a 
prominent role. This changed in July 1943 when Sena-
tor Wagner, Senator James Murray of Montana, and Rep-
resentative John Dingell of Michigan introduced the 
Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill (S 1161-HR 2861), a broad-
ening of the Social Security Act to include a provision 
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Congressman john D. Dingell (Democrat-Michigan), March 
1944. 
for national health insurance for persons of all ages fi-
nanced through a payroll tax. Senator Wagner's devo-
tion to the cause of organized labor was already 
legendary by the mid-l 940s, dating back to his service 
on New York's Triangle Waist ~hirt Commission with 
Samuel Gompers in 1911. Murray and Dingell had 
equally strong ties to organized labor. Representative 
Dingell was a life-long member of the International Ty-
pographical Union in Detroit, and Murray was a mem-
ber of the United Mine Workers of America who had 
witnessed the monumental labor violence in Butte in the 
early twentieth century. Murray's interest in health re-
form was a direct outgrowth of his concern for miners' 
suffering from silicosis.2 
Marjorie Shearon, once an aide to Falk at the Social 
Security Board, and later a health analyst for Republi-
can Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, claimed the 1943 bill 
was written with so much input from organized labor that 
the bill's working title was the "AFL Bill. "3 Falling victim 
to the combined effects of the war and a preoccupied 
president, the legislation died in 1944 at the end of the 
Seventy-eighth Congress. 
With opposition forces solidifying on all fronts against 
labor during the 1940s, the AFL and the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) began to work together 
on national health insurance. In 1944 the AFL appointed 
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Nelson Cruikshank, an ordained Methodist minister, as 
director of social insurance activities, a particularly ap-
propriate appointment because he had previously served 
as the head of migratory labor camps in the Farm Secu-
rity Administration and had organized a program of 
1,200 participating doctors to care for migrants in 200 
camps.4 
The CIO never gave as much priority to national 
health legislation as the A.FL. Kathleen Ellickson, a mem-
ber of the CIO's research department and formerly on 
the staff of the Social Security Board oversaw health is-
sues. Based as it was on industrial unionism, the CIO may 
have held out the hope that the problem could more 
easily be solved by direct contract negotiations with em-
ployers.5 Such hopes were less realistic for many AFL craft 
based union members, such as construction workers, less 
Nurse visiting Farm Security Administration (FSA) agricultural 
workers ' camp, Bridgeton, NJ, June 1942. Prior to becoming 
spokesman for the AFL on social security issues, Nelson 
Cruikshank served as director of the FSA 's 200 migratory labor 
camps where he introduced a program of govemmentfunded 
health care. 
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tied to one employer. Limited resources, however, ex-
isted for both organizations, and Cruikshank, like 
Ellickson, found himself working alone, without a staff. 
Altmeyer of the Social Security Board later recalled that 
Cruikshank and Ellickson had "to carry the ball and were 
always moaning and groaning that they still couldn't get 
their principals really steamed up. "6 Still, by 1944 orga-
nized labor had two full time professionals to press its 
health reform interests. 
In February 1944, Senator Wagner solidified plans for 
new legislation starting with a conference held in his of-
fice. Present were AFL representatives, members of the 
National Farmers Union, and a group of sympathetic 
doctors called the Physicians Forum. Michael Davis was 
also at the meeting, his work on health care having at-
Above: Kathl.een Ellickson of the CIO and Nelson Cruikshank 
of the AFL,june 1953. Right: This eight-page pamph!.et, For a 
Healthy America, origi,nally appeared as a policy statement 
by AFL President William Green during his testimony before the 
Senate subcommittee on Health and Education, September 18, 
1944. 
tracted the attention of the AFL and the CIO. Partici-
pants at the meeting decided to have Davis set up an 
outside group to be known as the Committee for the 
Nation's Health (CNH), funded largely by the labor 
movement and wealthy New York philanthropists Albert 
and Mary Lasker. 7 
When Roosevelt was reelected in November 1944, 
hopes ran high for new legislation with labor, liberal leg-
FORA 
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islators, private organizations, and wealthy, concerned 
public citizens forming an effective coalition. The 
president's death in April 1945 propelled into office an 
untested successor with an unknown agenda. Harry 
Truman quickly proved, however, a forceful ally to the 
national health insurance front. Cruik~hank, who played 
a key advisory role in drafting the new legislation, recalled 
later that "no one had to persuade Truman." The 
president's commitment to health care reform had 
grown out of his days as a judge in Missouri witnessing 
first-hand the results of poverty and inadequate medical 
care.8 
On, November 19, 1945, Truman delivered to Con-
gress a message proposing a program of national health 
insurance. William Green telegraphed Truman lauding 
his "vigorous and forward looking message." Green also 
urged AFL state and local bodies to support the presi-
dent.9 In early 1946, Green sent Truman a letter request-
ing minor changes in the bill. Truman quickly approved 
the changes, then passed them on to Senator Murray to 
be incorporated into the new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill 
(S 1606-HR 4 730) .10 To promote the bill, the AFL pro-
duced a pamphlet, entitled "For A Healthy America."11 
In June and July 1945 labor representatives and James 
Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, asked 
the surgeon general to sponsor a series of workshops 
relating to the health insurance bill. Cruikshank of the 
AFL, officials from the CIO, and the Social Security 
Board planned the workshops. The first was held in St. 
Paul, Minnesota, February 6-9, 1946. Its sixty-five del-
egates included representatives from the AFL, CIO, and 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, as well as govern-
ment officials. The conferences' not-so-hidden agenda 
was to drum up support for the Murray-Wagner-Dingell 
bill. Government officials distributed literature from the 
Committee for the Nation's Health, and Harry Becker 
of the U. S. Children's Bureau openly endorsed the 
Left: Notab/,e Ohioans, Senator Rnbert A. Taft and American 
Federation of Labor President William Green, temporarily shelve 
their political differences whi/,e receiving honorary degrees from 
Kenyon Colkge, Gambier, Ohio, June 194 9. Right: Dr. Morris 
Fishbein, editor of the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation and vigorous opponent of national health insurance 
kgislation, June 1940. 
health bill. The first conference's results pleased the or-
ganizers, and they planned several other workshops.12 
As the health insurance bill headed to committee, all 
signs looked favorable. But in the Senate, opposition, 
strongly encouraged by the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA), solidified under the direction of Senator 
Robert Taft. Son of a former president, Taft was an arch-
conservative and isolationist, determined to protect his 
ideal of small town independent yeomen and business-
men from the encroachments of big government and 
big labor. Such a world view, arguably well out-of-step 
with mid-twentieth century America, fitted conveniently 
with the AMA's view of doctors as autonomous servants 
of the community. Taft and the AMA quickly formed a 
powerful bulwark against Truman's health proposals. 
In April 1946, the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Education, chaired by James Murray, opened hearings 
on the new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. Within moments 
of its introduction, partisan bickering engulfed the pro-
posed legislation. When Senator Murray complained 
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about editorials that referred to his bill as socialistic, 
Senator Taft interrupted, charging that it was indeed 
socialistic. Murray retaliated, calling Taft "impertinent 
and insulting." Offended, Taft left the room, vowing not 
to return. 13 The hearings continued on an only slightly 
less acrimonious basis. Green and Cruikshank of the AFL 
testified on behalf of the bill, but the former quickly 
found himself being badgered about the overall costs of 
the proposed program, a subject about which he was 
hardly a specialist.14 With the Taft boycott, the hearings 
floundered. By July, Senator Murray recognized no 
health legislation could pass in 1946. He looked forward 
to the midterm elections with the hope of finding a more 
hospitable atmosphere.15 
While labor had mounted an impressive lobbying cam-
paign for the new health bill, those aligned against it 
belittled the effort. Dr. Morris Fishbein, the imperious 
editor of Journal of the American Medical Association, led 
the attack. Considered the "sparkplug" and "political 
boss" of the AMA, Fishbein vigorously attacked national 
health insurance, having the AMA buy newspaper space 
across the country to publish such items as a cartoon of 
a "socialized" doctor arriving not at a patient's sickbed, 
but at his funeral. 16 Fishbein used his position as editor 
of the AMA journal to rally doctors against the reforms. 
His editorial column endlessly attacked the bill, canon-
izing Taft for "the forthrightness with which he con-
demned the entire proceedings as a venture in 
socialism. "17 
The AMA offered an alternate "14 Point" plan for 
improving medical care based on extensions of volun-
tary plans and locally based aid to the needy.18 In May 
1946, Robert Taft introduced a bill (S 2143) promising 
grants to states to pay for health care for the very poor. 
The CNH immediately assailed Taft's bill as inadequate 
and humiliating for working men: "To require the half 
of the population to take a pauper's oath in order to see 
these doctors or be admitted to these hospitals is degrad-
ing and un-American. This is what the Taft plan means. "19 
One non-controversial bill on health did, however, pass. 
On August 13, Alabama Senator Lister Hill and Ohio 
Senator Harold H . Burton's hospital construction grant 
bill, introduced the previous year, became law. 
The wave of post-war strikes in 1946 hampered Labor's 
effectiveness as a lobbying agent. With workers every-
36 SUMMER 1993 
where walking the picket lines, focusing on the complexi-
ties of health reform proved difficult for the unions. One 
outcome of the strikes was an unprecedented health care 
package negotiated by John L. Lewis of the United Mine 
Workers of America.20 This contract breakthrough 
opened the door for other workers to demand similar 
programs and created an atmosphere of competition 
among industrial unions trying to keep up with each 
other in improving health, pension, and welfare ben-
efits. 21 In September 1946, the newly elected president 
of the United Automobile Workers, Walter Reuther, 
wrote Falk of the Social Security Board asking for his help 
in preparing a study for the development of a group in-
surance program for auto workers.22 On the other hand, 
management viewed health benefits much differently. 
Irving S. Olds, chairman of the board of U.S. Steel, in-
sisted that welfare was not a suitable topic for negotia-
tion and that only the hazardous nature of the mining 
profession warranted special treatment.23 
The 1 ~46 congressional elections proved a c~lamity 
for Democrats, with Republicans achieving a majority in 
the Senate. Taft replaced Murray as chairman of the 
newly renamed Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 
Taft used his new clout to ram through, over a presiden-
tial veto, the Taft-Hartley Act imposing new restrictions 
on unions. New efforts to pass a revised health insurance 
bill in the summer of 1947 went nowhere with Taft in 
charge of the committee. In particular, the increasingly 
tense cold war atmosphere of anti-communism ham-
pered supporters of the bill. Opponents of national 
health insurance labeled it "socialized medicine." 
Shearon, Falk's former staffer, now working for Senator 
Taft, spent endless hours linking proponents of the 
Murray-Wagner-Dingell legislation to socialism or com-
munism. Shearon also drew attention to the use of gov-
ernment funds to sponsor the "Health Workshops." Falk 
warned his employees of Shearon's actions and urged 
caution, but the workshops had already come to the at-
tention of the House Committee on the Expenditures 
of the Executive.24 Subcommittee hearings to investigate 
the workshops ran concurrently with the hearings on the 
A strident cartoon on the supposed evils of "socialized" medi-
cine, created lYy the National Physicians Committee, an AMA-
funded institution, February 1946. 
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT "SOCIALIZES" MEDICINE 
lABOR'S HERITAGE 37 
1947 health insurance bill (S 1320). House subcommit-
tee members did not call any labor officials to testify at 
the hearings on the workshops, but witnesses mentioned 
the participation of Cruikshank and others. Ultimately 
a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report cleared 
the organizers of any wrongdoing, but the political dam-
age caused the cancellation of a series of workshops 
planned for the South.25 
In this adverse political climate, supporters of national 
health insurance took a more conciliatory approach. 
CNH began a campaign to appeal to groups "on the 
fence" of the issue. Committee director Davis privately 
recommended that the administration try introducing 
several scaled-down pieces of legislation including farm 
health bills and public aid to voluntary health insurance.26 
Having hit a lull in 1947, Truman recognized that a 
fresh approach was necessary. To breathe new life into 
his health proposals, he appointed Oscar Ewing, a char-
ismatic and respected New York lawyer and member of 
the Democratic National Committee to the position of 
Federal Security Administrator. Although politically ex-
perienced and hoping to use health reform as a possible 
launching pad for a 1952 run for the presidency, Ewing 
was shocked by the level of partisan acrimony over the 
health issue. An interview in the New York Times quoted 
him as referring to himself as "an innocent in politics 
compared to these medical politicians-they can slit a 
throat with great ease. "27 Ewing announced that he was 
undecided about national health insurance. Eager to es-
tablish a broad base of support for health reform, he 
called for a high profile National Health Assembly to 
meet in May 1948 to discuss the issue. To organize his 
Health Assembly, Ewing appointed to an executive com-
mittee some who favored national health insurance: 
President Green of the AFL, President Murray of the 
CIO, and President Patton of the National Farmers 
Union. Also serving on the committee were others hos-
tile to nationalizing the health system, such as a repre-
sentative from Metropolitan Life Insurance, and the 
presidents of the American Chamber of Commerce and 
American Medical Association. This committee met and 
set an agenda for the assembly designed to "stake out 
areas of agreement. "28 
In May 1948, the assembly opened with several hun-
dred participants representing a spectrum from Fishbein 
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Above: Oscar Ewing, Federal Security Agency Administrator 
(194 7-195 2). Although a strong advocate of national health 
insurance, he was a longtime friend of Harvard Law School 
classmate Senator Robert Taft, principal opponent of health l.eg-
islation. ~ght: Older workers often suffered from medi<;al prob-
1.ems. Chronic anemia forced the retirement of this former steel-
worker, who is receiving a periodic transfusion of whole blood, 
May 1949. 
of the AMA to Davis of the CNH. Remarkably, in spite 
of the diverse viewpoints, the participants found com-
mon ground. The AFL, CIO, and National Farmers 
Union began by putting forth several principles to guide 
health care reform. To the utter surprise of everyone, 
the AMA delegates endorsed several of the key principles, 
including the notion that "contributory health insurance 
should be the basic method of financing health care for 
the majority of the American people." Although the AMA 
delegation also accepted the general principle that "tax 
resources" might contribute to health care where insur-
ance fell short, the organization did not endorse any 
form of government-operated health insurance program. 
The only instance of disharmony in the conference came 
when Fishbein rose to declare that the "workers of 
America do not want peasant medicine." This warranted 
an immediate and sharp response from Cruikshank, in-
sisting that Fishbein had "no right to speak for Ameri-
can workers. "29 
Ewing's Health Assembly was the first attempt to ac-
tively interest business in national health insurance. 
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Harold Swift, chairman of the board of Swift Meat Pack-
ing, Gerald Swope, chairman of the board of General 
Electric, and Paul Hoffman, president of Studebaker, all 
attended the conference. While business leaders gener-
ally opposed a national plan, they were clearly interested 
in improving the state of the nation's health care sys-
tem. 
Although the conference never endorsed national 
health insurance, organized labor and the Truman ad-
ministration did not abandon their attachment to the 
issue. Before the conference, in early 1948, AFL Presi-
dent Green had Cruikshank meet with Ewing about the 
possibility of preparing a new health care bill for 1949. 
Although Ewing was officially neutral on the issue, Green 
told Senator Wagner, "I am glad to report that Mr. 
Ewing's response was a favorable one."30 
Cruikshank outlined recommendations for a new bill 
that "would not try to do too much too quickly." He sug-
gested a more concisely written bill and the exclusion of 
persons earning over five thousand dollars a year. He 
also proposed that the administration assign a ''White 
House spokesman" to shore up support for the bill, par-
ticularly among southern Democrats.31 Approving 
Cruikshank's proposals, Wagner confidently wrote Green 
that the "period of incubation is about over. Now we need 
action."32 
The White House assigned Oscar Ewing to the task. 
Casting aside the middle ground prescribed by his Health 
Assembly, which assiduously avoided any endorsement 
of national health insurance, Ewing released in Septem-
ber 1948 a 185-page study supporting national health 
insurance entitled "The Nation's Health: A Ten Year 
Program." At the beginning of his report, Ewing thanked 
each member of the Health Assembly's executive com-
mittee, including the AMA representatives, who in no 
way had endorsed its contents. In his report, Ewing out-
lined the seriousness of the nation's health needs, rec-
ommended extensive state and local cooperation on 
medical matters, and proposed a comprehensive national 
health insurance plan. Ewing called for guaranteed medi-
cal care, including dental and mental health care, for 
all Americans to be funded by a 3% tax on annual earn-
ings with some contributions from the federal 
government's general revenue.33 Dr. Fishbein immedi-
ately attacked Ewing's report as "a shrewdly contrived 
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document full of innumerable misrepresentations. "34 
Ewing released his recommendations on September 
2, 1948, just as the presidential campaign was heating 
up. Truman quickly endorsed the proposals, making 
them a rallying cry for the incumbent president in the 
face of congressional inaction. Truman's vigorous sup-
port for national health insurance also helped, along with 
his veto of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, to shore up 
the often wavering support of organized labor for his 
reelection. His upset victory promised a bright future for 
health insurance. With the active support of Truman and 
Ewing and the return of the Democrats to control of the 
Senate and the House, potential for a national health 
insurance program reached its highest point. 
The American Medical Association was not prepared 
to take the shift in fortunes lightly. It assessed each of its 
members $25 to fund a campaign by the California-based 
public relations firm of Baxter and Whitaker. The AMA 
gave the firm a budget of $1,600,000 for 1949. Among 
otht;r activities, Baxter and Whitaker mailed letters to 
Protestant clergy across the nation, asserting: "To the 
Christian who believes in the sanctity of life nothing 
could be more dangerous than the spectacle of politi-
cians arbitrarily juggling the birth rate through the ap-
plication of propaganda. "35 To AMA members it sent 
posters and pamphlets of the Sir Luke Fildes painting 
The Doctor, with captions reading: 'Would you change this 
picture? Compulsory health insurance is political medi-
cine," and "Voluntary Health Insurance-The American 
Way will keep politics out of this picture. "36 The adver-
tising firm moved quickly to link health care legislation 
with communism, falsely crediting V. I. Lenin with say-
ing, "socialized medicine is the keystone of the socialist 
state. "37 
In January 1949, Cruikshank and Ewing had a debate 
on radio with Dr. Fishbein of the AMA. Planting a ques-
tion in the audience for Fishbein, Cruikshank and Ewing 
got the AMA editor to describe in detail his "hard work-
ing" trip to England to study that country's health sys-
tem. Cruikshank then countered by reading Fishbein's 
account of the trip published in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association in which the doctor described the 
visit as a leisurely vacation, dominated by eating and golf. 
The live audience erupted with laughter against Fishbein. 
As a direct result of the incident, later that year, the AMA 
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Nelson Cruikshank (left), American Federation of Labor spe-
cialist on health issues, and Oscar Ewing (right) , Federal Secu-
rity Agency Administrator, ca. 1949. Symbolizing the close co-
ofJeration between organized labor and the Truman adminis-
tration, Cruikshank and Ewing toured the country promoting 
national health insurance. 
journal removed Fishbein as editor.38 
Another blow to the AMA came with a Justice Depart-
ment investigation of the association for monopolistic 
practices. The Committee on the Nation's Health as well 
as other groups had long argued the AMA was monopo-
lizing doctors, and by the late 1940s, the Truman admin-
istration was eager to follow up these charges against its 
political enemy. As part of a thorough inquiry, the FBI 
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raided the AMA' s Chicago headquarters in search of files 
dating back to the 1930s. 39 
By the time that Senate and House hearings opened 
in May 1949 on a new Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill (S 
1679-HR 4312), the harmony found at the National 
Health Assembly the previous year had evaporated. Sena-
tor Taft again promoted an alternative bill to provide 
funds for the care of the indigent. A group of moderate 
Republicans, led by Senator Irving Ives of New York and 
Ralph Flanders ofVermont introduced the Flanders-Ives 
bill (S. 1970-HR 4918), a health package which in-
cluded hospital construction and government support 
for private insurance plans. The Flanders-Ives bill at-
tracted the support of Republicans, such as Richard 
Nixon, who were eager to report back to constituents 
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that they had supported at least some measure of health 
care reform. 40 Dr. Winslow Carlton, who had developed 
hospital prepayment plans in New York City and who was 
a close associate of Davis, helped draft the Flanders-Ives 
bill. Carlton believed the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill, 
promoting a full scale reorganization of the health care 
system, was too comprehensive to pass.41 
The hearings on the various health bills proceeded 
on a crowded and confused docket. Missouri Senator 
Forest C. Donnell, a Republican-described by Dr. 
Carlton as seeing communists under every bed-took the 
lead in attacking the proposed national health insur-
ance. 42 During Cruikshank's testimony, Donnell de-
manded to know what part Cruikshank had played in 
drafting the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. While the AFL 
staffer denied sitting "with those who actually drafted it," 
he did admit to providing an outline of AFL concerns 
to Truman congressional Democrats. Donnell also chal-
lenged Cruikshank's insistence that the AFL had "no 
desire to socialize medicine." The Missouri senator em-
phasized the degree of governmental control the bill 
would introduce into medical practice and concluded, 
that "this is another step toward socialism. "43 In another 
exchange at the hearings, CIO Secretary-Treasurer James 
Carey told the story of a CIO member who had become 
ill and subsequently insolvent because his health plan 
paid for only one month of hospitalization. Senator Taft 
insisted that the story was uncommon, claiming no more 
than one in fifty persons would suffer such a calamity.44 
In spite of Ewing's efforts to interest business leaders 
in supporting the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill, Robert 
Hornby of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce Committee 
on Social Security testified against the bill, citing his own 
company's employee health plan.45 While business lead-
ers had shown some interest in increasing social secu-
rity payments to ease pressure for employee pension 
plans, they expressed no similar interest in a national 
health plan. 
By the summer of 1949, the combined efforts of the 
AMA, the American Dental Association, the American 
Pharmaceutical Association, the private insurance cor-
porations, and dozens of other groups allied against the 
national health insurance program managed to stall in 
committee the 1949 version of national health insurance. 
No action was ever taken on S 1676 or HR 4312 in ei-
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ther chamber of Congress. In July, Senator Taft trium-
phantly wrote to opponents of national health insurance, 
"the administration has dropped any idea of passing the 
Murray-Wagner-Dingell bill. "46 
According to Nelson Cruikshank, two developments 
in 1949 doomed the health insurance program. First, all 
precedents holding back large industrial unions from 
negotiating for fringe benefits such as health insurance 
were suddenly wiped away. In the midst of the push for 
health legislation, the National Labor Relations Board 
ruled that group health and accident insurance was a 
legitimate issue for collective bargaining. On May 24, 
1949, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. The 
Supreme Court quickly sustained the decision when it 
declined to review the case.47 Henceforth, welfare items 
would be every bit as appropriate a bargaining topic as 
wage and hour issues. 
The second development, cited by Cruikshank, in-
volved contract negotiations themselves. The United 
Steel Workers of America (USWA) requested bot)l wage 
increases and a pension and health plan in its 1949 ne-
gotiations with steel companies. Talks quickly stalled. In 
the summer of 1949, President Truman appointed a 
presidential Steel Industry Board to mediate the matter. 
After studying the issue and determining that fringe ben-
efits would not have the inflationary impact of a wage 
increase, the board granted a 10¢ an hour social secu-
rity package that included an employer-sponsored health 
plan. Following quickly on the heels of the USWA con-
tract, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) in late 
1949 negotiated hospital, sickness, and accident insur-
ance benefits for its members. 
While some advocates continued to push for national 
health insurance, many key participants recognized that 
labor's new welfare contracts doomed the latest Murray-
Wagner-Dingell bill. Falk, the head of research at Social 
Security, saw the union contracts as having an "almost 
hypnotic effect" on workers, blinding them to the need 
for more comprehensive programs.49 Organized labor, 
however, did not entirely abandon a national health bill. 
According to Ellickson, the CIO, unlike the AFL, believed 
A CIO poster supporting national health insurance, ca. 1949. 
It conveys the powerful image of health care for a family with 
young chi/,dren. 
AS IT WILL BE 
if we get 
Congress 
to enact 
NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE: 
::·'"··!Y.·.>.:.:.: .... ·.·.···~-:J~~·. · ······· ·~~: 
JOE DROPS IN TO SEE THE DOCTOR AND THE DOCTOR COMES TO JOE'S. LATER MRS. WORKER TAKES LITTLE 
SEE, DOC, l'M INSURED 
AGAIN THIS YEAR. AND 
WHILE l'M HERE., HOW 
ABOUT LOOKING ME OVER? 
I WANT TO SEND MARY 
IN NEXT WEEK FOR AN 
EXAMINATION , TOO 
SHE FELT WORSE THIS MOR.NING. 
DOCTOR, SO I THOUGHT l'D BETTER 
CALL YOU. IS IT SERIOUS ? 
DR BROWN'S SECRETARY SENDS A 
JOHNNY TO BE EXAMINED. 
HOW LUCKY WE ARE THAT THE 
DOCTOR AND HOSPITAL BILLS ARE 
BEING PAID BY THE INSURANCE FUND. 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS YOU HAVE MADE 
FROM YOUR PAY CERTAINLY HAVE 
BEEN WORTHWHILE 
/ 
that health and welfare bargaining encouraged govern-
ment legislation because it educated workers as to the 
benefits of health insurance and the need for further 
expansion to the millions still without medical coverage.50 
Generally negotiating with larger industrial companies, 
the CIO was in a better position than the AFL to estab-
lish health benefits for its members through collective 
bargaining. More than the AFL, the CIO essentially put 
its eggs in two baskets on the health care front, pressing 
for coverage through collective bargaining while also 
calling for national health insurance. While Ellickson 
might not have seen the contradictions in the CIO's ef-
forts, others did. Cruikshank, for instance, saw the col-
lective bargaining breakthroughs as taking the heat off 
of his efforts for a nationalized system of health care. 
Harry Becker, head of the social security department for 
the CIO-affiliated UAW and formerly a Children's Bu-
reau staffer who helped organize the health insurance 
workshops, became the leading CIO figure promoting 
national health insurance in the 1950s, but his efforts 
went nowhere. 
The demise of the 1949 health care legislation forced 
supporters of national health insurance to redirect their 
efforts. In the summer of 1950, Falk wrote a memo sug-
gesting a shift in approach, asking, "what about the plan 
we have frequently discussed in the past-health ben-
efits for those who are OASI [Old Age Survivors Insur-
ance] beneficiaries?"51 A bill (S 3001-HR 7484) to 
establish a health plan restricted to the elderly was in-
troduced in 1952 by Senator Murray and Congressman 
Dingell among others. A version of this bill was finally 
passed as the Medicare plan in the mid-l 960s. As was 
the case with the Murray-Wagner-Dingell bills, organized 
labor, in particular Cruikshank and Ellickson, now work-
ing together at the AFL-CIO, cooperated during the 
1960s with members of Congress and with the sympa-
thetic Lyndon Johnson administration to develop and 
pass the Medicare plan. 
The efforts of government and unions in promoting 
national health insurance after World War II failed be-
cause of business opposition and the remarkably effec-
tive resistance of Senator Taft and the AMA. Yet the drive 
for national health insurance did bring the issue of 
health to the nation's attention, allowing the rise of an 
alternative system in which business and labor arranged 
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I T'S MY HEART, 
voe, NOT MY 
POCKETBOOK 
During the decade of the 1950s organized labor continued to 
regard federally mandated health insurance as important. This 
195 3 cartoon appeared with the statement: ''We in the CIO must 
continue the struggle for better health on many fronts. Under 
present political conditions, the greatest hope for progress lies 
through collective bargaining, but our accomplishments through 
that channel do not lessen the need for government action. " 
for health coverage through collective bargaining. Ironi-
cally, this boom in private insurance helped bury the 
national insurance program. The story of labor's first 
drive for national health insurance reflects the difficult 
choices faced by organized labor, forever operating in 
an antagonistic atmosphere. In spite of powerful politi-
cal ties reaching directly into the White House, conser-
vative opposition forced organized labor to rely on its 
tradition of voluntarism and self-reliance through eco-
nomic power as the most immediate and perhaps only 
avenue to provide its membership with basic health se-
curity. • 
NOTES 
Edmund F. Wehrle is a Ph.D. candidate at the Uni-
versity of Maryland at College Park, specializing in 
post-New Deal organized labor. He is the author of 
'Work Begins Today: Quaker Volunteers in Hemphill, 
Kentucky, 1933," Register of the Kentucky Historical Soci-
ety, 90(Fall1992): 345-367. 
'Wilber Cohn, "Memoir," 
Columbia University Oral 
History Project, 1966, p. 36; 
Arthur Altmeyer, "Memoir," 
Columbia University Oral 
History Project, 1966, p. 61. 
2Donald E. Spritzer, Senator 
James E. Murray and the Limits of 
Post-New Deal Liberalism, (New 
York, 1985), pp. 8 & 123. 
'Majorie Shearon, "Blue-
print for the Nationalization of 
Medicine," file "Health 1946-
1947," Box 643, Robert Taft 
Papers, Library of Congress 
(Hereafter Taft Papers). 
4Nelson Cruikshank, 
"Memoir," Columbia 
University Oral History 
Project, pp. l, 28 & 474. The 
AFL and CIO considered 
forming a common social 
security department but could 
not overcome their differ-
ences. 
5Ted Silvey interview with 
author, Oct. 24, 1991, 
Washington, DC. As part of 
the CIO's Community Service 
Department, Ted Silvey had 
traveled to England and was 
impressed by the Bevridge 
plan, a comprehensive 
expansion of social services, 
including national health 
insurance, designed to care for 
English citizens from the 
cradle to the grave. Upon his 
return, Silvey met with CIO 
President Philip Murray to try 
to arrange for a CIO spon-
sored tour for British Health 
Minister Aneurin Bevan to 
promote national health 
insurance. But Murray's 
insistence on stressing wage 
gains first, and his anti-British 
Scottish roots, led him to turn 
down Silvey's proposal. 
Murray's personal disinterest 
may have been another reason 
that the CIO showed less 
leadership on national health 
insurance than the AFL. 
6Altmeyer, "Memoir," p. 170; 
Cruikshank, "Memoir," p. 359. 
7Robert Wagner to William 
Green, Mar. 3, 1944, Robert 
Wagner Papers, Georgetown 
University (Hereafter Wagner 
Papers). Mrs. Lasker had 
suffered frequent illnesses as a 
child and was committed to 
use some of the wealth that 
she and her husband had 
accumulated to improve the 
health of the country. 
8Cruikshank, "Memoir," p. 
6. 
9 William Green to Harry 
Truman, Nov. 19, 1945, Box 
24, AFL Legislative Records, 
The George Meany Memorial 
Archives (Hereafter AFL 
Legislative Records). 
'°William Green to James 
Murray, Mar. 12, 1946, Box 45, 
Federal Security Administra-
tion Records, National 
Archives, RG 235 (Hereafter 
FSA Records). 
11"For a Healthy America," 
Box 13, AFL Pamphlet 
Collection, The George Meany 
Memorial Archives. 
"Margaret Klem, "Memo," 
Sept. 12, 1947, Box 24, FSA; 
U.S., Congress, House, 
Subcommittee on Publicity 
and Propaganda of the 
Committee on Expenditures 
of the Executive Hearings, 80th 
Cong., 1947, pp. 30 & 83-85. 
"U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Education and 
Labor, Hearings, 79th Cong., 
P· 51. 
141/Jid., p. 488.James Carey, 
secretary-treasurer of the CIO 
also testified at the hearings. 
15New York Times, July 10, 
1946. 
16Howard Whitman, 
"Doctors in an Uproar," 
Colliers, May 14, 1945, p.21; 
cartoon by National Physicians 
Committee, Feb. 3, 1946, Box 
327, Wagner Papers. 
11Joumal of the American 
Medical Association, 130 (Apr. 
13, 1946) :1016. 
18New York Times,July 19, 
1945. 
19Committee for the 
Nation's Health, ''National 
Health News," Box 24, AFL 
Legislative Records. 
20Barbara Berney, "The Rise 
and Fall of the UMW Fund," 
Southern Exposure, 6 (Summer 
1978), p. 95-102. 
21 Cruikshank, "Memoir," p. 
50; Monthly Labor Review, 64 
(Feb. 1947):191. Workers 
covered by some sort of health 
benefits plan doubled between 
1945 and 194 7 to include 
around 1,250,000 workers. 
22Walter Reuther to Isadore 
Falk, Sept. 12, 1946, Box 14, 
FSA Records. 
"Journal of Commerce, July 
23, 1947. 
24Falk, "Memo," Apr. 4, 
1947, Box 25, FSA Records. 
25"Memo," Apr. 18, 1949, 
Box 25, FSA Records. 
26Michael Davis to Oscar 
Ewing, Nov. 6, 1947, Box 46, 
FSA Records. 
27Altmeyer, "Memoir," p. 
132-33; New York Times, Jan. 29, 
1948. 
28Ewing telegram to 
Executive Committee, Feb. 6, 
1948, Box 14, FSA Records. 
29 The New York Times, May 5, 
1948. 
'°William Green to Robert 
Wagner, Feb. 13, 1948,Box 
328, Wagner Papers. 
311/Jid., (Cruikshank outline 
attached). 
32Robert Wagner to William 
Green, Mar. 12, 1948, Box 328, 
Wagner Papers. 
380scar Ewing, The Nation's 
Health: A Ten Year Program, 
(Washington DC, 1948). 
"Whitman, "Doctors in an 
Uproar," p.54. 
35 The Washington Post, Feb. 
2, 1949. 
'"Whitman, "Doctors in a 
Uproar," p.54. 
Pamphlet 
issued in 194 9 
containing 
Federal Security 
Administrator 
Oscar Ewing's 
arguments for 
compulsory 
health insurance 
and America 
Medical Association 
Secretary George 
Lull's arguments 
opposing it. 
37Labor Press Association 
release, Aug. 26, 1949. 
38Frank D. Campion, The 
AMA and U. S. Health Policy 
Since 1940, (Chicago, 1984), p. 
124. 
39The New York Times, Aug. 
23, 1949. 
40Monte M. Poen, Harry S. 
Truman Versus the Medical 
LobfJy, (Columbia, Missouri, 
1979), p. 166. 
41Winslow Carlton, 
"Memoir," Columbia 
University Oral History 
Project, 1966, p. 9. 
42/bid., p.14. 
43U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Labor and 
Welfare, Hearings, 8lst Cong., 
1949, p.324-55. 
441/Jid., pp. 420-27. Senator 
Taft also interrupted Carey's 
testimony several times 
seeking irrelevant information 
about the failure of certain 
CIO affiliates to hold 
elections. 
451/Jid., p. 878. 
46Robert Taft office form 
letter,July 26, 1949, Box 904, 
Taft Papers. 
47Cruikshank, "Memoir," p. 
6; Monthly Labor &view, 69 
(July 1949):3. 
48 Monthly Labor Review, 69 
(Dec. 1949):648. 
49Isadore Falk, "Memoir," 
Columbia University Oral 
History Project, 1966, p. 283. 
50Kathleen Ellickson, 
"Memoir," Columbia 
University Oral History 
Project, 1966, p. 58. 
51 lsadore Falk, "Memo," 
June 20, 1950, Box 29, FSA 
Records. 
Cl) 
w 
> 
:f 
~ 
...J 
<( 
a: 
0 
:;: 
w 
:;: 
>-z 
U'i 
, :;: 
w 
(!J 
a: 
@ 
(!J 
w 
I 
I-
LABOR'S HERITAGE 45 
r ; 
I 
